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Indispensability Argument and Set Theory
The Quinean indispensability argument,  as put 
by Mark Colyvan (2001: The Indispensability of  
Mathematics, Oxford University Press, 192 pp., 
p.1): "... mathematical entities are indispensable 
to our best physical theories and therefore share 
the ontological status of scientific entities."
Of  course,  one  may  take  several  different 
positions with respect to the ontological  status 
of  scientific  entities  such  as,  for  example, 
quarks  (quarks  can't  be  observed  even  in 
principle). Do quarks "really exist", or are they 
only  a  (currently  successful)  theoretical 
construct  used  by  physicists  in  their  models? 
Perhaps, the "least committed" position could be 
the  formalist  one:  let  us  define  the  "real 
existence"  of  some  scientific  entity  as  its 
invariance in future scientific theories. If quarks 
will be retained as a construct in our best future 
physical theories, then one may think of quarks 
as  "really  existing".  Even  from  such  a  very 
formalistic point of view, the Quinean argument 
seems  quite  reasonable.  Indeed,  if  some 
mathematical entity is indispensable to our best 
physical theories, then shouldn't we believe, that 
this entity "exists" in the same sense as quarks 
are believed to exist?
However, imagine two mathematical entities E1 
and E2, such that the existence of E1 contradicts 
the existence of E2. Can both of such entities be 
indispensable to our best physical theories? As 
an  example,  let  us  consider  two  well-known 
versions of set theory:
ZFC, i.e. ZF+AC, where ZF stands for Zermelo-
Fraenkel  axioms,  and  AC  is  the  Axiom  of 
Choice,  see  Thomas  Jech (2006: Set  Theory, 
Springer, 772 pp., Chapter 1);
ZF+AD, where AD is the so-called  Axiom of 
Determinacy, see Akihiro Kanamori (2003: The 
Higher Infinite: Large Cardinals in Set Theory  
from  Their  Beginnings,  Springer,  564  pp., 
Chapter 6).
AD contradicts AC, hence, these theories cannot 
be  used  together.  Currently,  ZFC  is  almost 
generally acknowledged as the formal basis for 
theoretical  mathematics.  If  ZF+AD  would  be 
used  instead  of  ZFC,  then  we  would  have  a 
slightly  different  theoretical  mathematics. 
Worse,  or  better  than  the  actual  one?  Who 
knows...  But:  as  a  basis  for  the  applied 
mathematics,  ZFC  and  ZF+AD  can  be  used 
equally well!  All  the mathematical  inferences, 
currently necessary for physical theories, can be 
performed in ZF, i.e. in ZFC and in ZF+AD as 
well.  Then,  which  of  both  set  theories  is 
indispensable  to  our  best  physical  theories  - 
ZFC, or ZF+AD?
May one believe that some of the proper ZFC 
inferences  (i.e.  inferences  involving  AC  that 
can't  be  performed  in  ZF  alone)  could,  some 
time  in  the  future,  be  applied  in  physical 
theories?  But  so  could  proper  ZF+AD 
inferences as well!
Would you say now that this  is  nothing new? 
That  with  the  non-Euclidean  geometries  we 
have  exactly  the  same  situation:  there  are 
several geometries contradicting each other, but 
all  of  them  are  indispensable  to  our  best 
physical  theories?  Indeed,  the  Euclidean 
geometry  and  non-Euclidean  geometries  are 
now  become  special  cases  of  a  more  general 
theory that inspired Einstein's general relativity 
theory - the so-called Riemannian geometry, see 
Peter  Petersen (2006:  Riemannian  Geometry, 
Springer, 408 pp.).
And  with  set  theories  we  have  the  same 
situation! As a set theory, ZF+AD is much more 
powerful  than  ZFC.  According  to  a  theorem 
proved by  W.  Hugh Woodin,  ZF+AD can be 
"embedded" into a powerful extension of ZFC, 
obtained by adding one of  the  so-called  large 
cardinal  axioms  ("There  are  infinitely  many 
Woodin  cardinals"),  and  conversely,  this 
powerful extension of ZFC can be "embedded" 
into  ZF+AD.  See  Kanamori  (2003:  Theorem 
32.16). Should this mean, as in the case of non-
Euclidean geometries, that set theories ZFC and 
ZF+AD  are  both indispensable  to  our  best 
physical theories?
But  then,  how  about  the  most  fundamental 
mathematical entity - the famous unique "world 
of sets" to which we ought to have ontological 
commitment  and  that  must  be  studied  in  set 
theory  as  the  only  structure  worth  of 
consideration?  And  in  which  the  famous 
Continuum Hypothesis  must  be either  true,  or 
false,  independently  of  the  ability  of  human 
mathematicians  to  decide  this?  Which  of  the 
axioms  -  AC,  or  AD is  true  in  this  "world"? 
Most set theorists accept AC, and reject AD, i.e. 
for them, AC is true in the "world of sets", and 
AD is false. Applying to set theory the above-
mentioned  formalistic  explanation  of  the 
existence of quarks, we could say: if, for a long 
time  in  the  future,  set  theorists  will  continue 
their believing in AC, then one may think of a 
unique "world of sets" as existing in the same 
sense as quarks are believed to exist.
But,  as  we  see,  this  is  only  a  "light-weight" 
opinion that  can't  be  justified  by the  Quinean 
indispensability  argument!  And,  when it  can't, 
then  "what  is  the  fuss  about?"  (as  put  by  a 
prominent logician).
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